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measures. The ICJ, for example, has traditionally been cautious in this respect, having so
far not gone beyond rebuking counsel for unduly delaying the proceedings,10 and disregarding
untruthful evidence without reproaching counsel.11 In interstate proceedings, such restraint
in regulating counsel conduct and sanctioning misbehavior is generally appropriate as counsel
behavior, more often than not, will be a reflection of the state party’s instruction, rather than
counsel’s independent course of action. Moreover, in the absence of compulsory jurisdiction,
an international court or tribunal must navigate the fine line between exercising its judicial
function independently of the state parties before it, while maintaining states’ willingness to
submit future disputes to international dispute settlement.
The attitude of the court or tribunal should, however, change if more and more private
attorneys start acting as counsel in international proceedings, as already is the case in
investment treaty arbitration, and start developing behavior that is independent of state
instructions and prejudices not only the integrity of the proceedings, but has the potential to
cause detriment to the party represented. In such cases, a duty of the court or tribunal may
kick in to address unethical counsel behavior more actively and through formal means. For
this purpose, international courts and tribunals should be cognizant of the powers to regulate
counsel conduct and to sanction breach, which are expressly given to them in their founding
statutes or conferred upon them as a matter of inherent necessity, and make use of them in
order to ensure the fair, efficient and legitimate administration of international justice.
Fraudulent Evidence at the International Court of Justice
By Cecily Rose*
This contribution begins by considering the problem of fraudulent evidence at the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ or Court) from the perspective of the opposing party—that is,
the party that receives rather than submits the suspect evidence. In particular, what factors
might motivate the opposing party to challenge documentary submissions as false, or to
refrain from doing so? This contribution then considers how the ICJ should respond to
such allegations of fraud, and whether it has any obligations to raise concerns about fraud
proprio motu.
Fraudulent Evidence from the Perspective of an Opposing Party
In considering whether to challenge the authenticity of documentary submissions, an
opposing party could view this problem not only from the standpoint of legal ethics, but
also from the standpoint of litigation strategy. Neither perspective is governed by international
legal rules, due the absence of binding ethics rules for counsel appearing before the ICJ,
and the fact that the ICJ’s Rules of Court and Practice Directions do not address such issues.
But the International Law Association’s Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel
10 See Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 542 (2d ed. 1985) (referencing
Corfu Channel, Pleadings, Vol. III, at 187–88). See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Provisional Measures, Order, 1993
ICJ Rep. 325, 336–37, para. 21 (Sept. 13).
11 See Keith Highet, Evidence, the Chamber and the ELSI Case, in Fact-Finding Before International
Tribunals 33, 65–68 (Richard Lillich ed., 1992); Elettronica Sicula (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 ICJ Rep. 15,
para. 26 (July 20); W. Michael Reisman & Christina Parajon Skinner, Fraudulent Evidence Before
Public International Tribunals: The Dirty Stories of International Law 54–77, 163–92 (2014).
* Assistant Professor, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden Law School.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0272503700103374
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 13 Oct 2017 at 10:04:24, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
330 ASIL Proceedings, 2016
Appearing Before International Courts and Tribunals (The Hague Principles) may nevertheless
provide useful guidance.
From the perspective of litigation strategy, an opposing party may have everything to gain
by seeking to exclude fraudulent evidence that falsely and unfairly strengthens the other
party’s case. But a decision by an opposing party to challenge the authenticity of the
other party’s documentary submissions could run the risk of drawing attention to its own
submissions, which could also be of questionable authenticity. This consideration will, of
course, not play a role where the opposing party has complete certainty of the authenticity
of its own submissions. External counsel may, however, have their doubts in situations where
they have simply been presented by their client with a voluminous set of purportedly authentic
documents from government archives. External counsel may have little capacity to assess
the authenticity of such documents themselves, without the help of historians, linguists, or
forensic experts. Thus, in raising questions about possible forgery, an opposing party could
inadvertently prompt questions about its own submissions, some of which could also be
fraudulent. Such a challenge could, at least in theory, attract increased scrutiny by both
parties and the Court itself of the entire documentary record in the case at hand.
The likelihood that a challenge by an opposing party would result in greater scrutiny of
its own documents by the other party will depend in part on the other party’s capacity and
willingness to devote financial resources to retaining external forensic experts. In Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), for
instance, Bahrain retained leading historians and forensic experts to analyze documents
submitted by Qatar.1 But not all disputing parties before the ICJ may be willing or able to
go so far, particularly in smaller-scale instances of possible forgery.
In addition, the Court itself may be relatively unlikely to respond to such a challenge by
undertaking an examination of both parties’ documents—either on its own, or with the help
of experts. In general, the Court takes a relatively passive stance with respect to many
evidentiary matters. Although nothing prevents the Court from investigating the authenticity
of submitted documents, it appears to have no history of doing so. Instead, the Court tends
to depend on the parties to provide authentic, relevant evidence, with little interference or
direction from the bench.
Thus, on the one hand, an opposing party may have an interest in not drawing any
unnecessary attention to the authenticity of the annexes it has submitted to the Court. On
the other hand, the risks involved in calling attention to its own annexes might be outweighed
by the advantages to be gained from having the other party’s fraudulent documents excluded
by the Court. In making this assessment, the scale of the suspected forgery and the importance
of excluding the documents from the Court’s record may be important considerations for
the opposing party.
From the perspective of legal ethics, counsel for an opposing party are not bound by any
legal obligation to challenge the other party’s documentary evidence in instances of suspected
fraud. The ICJ’s Practice Directions for states appearing before it make no mention of issues
regarding the authenticity of evidence and what might be done in situations of suspected
fraud. Principle 3.2 of The Hague Principles does, however, provide that counsel shall not
advise or assist a client to engage in conduct that he or she knows or ought to know is
fraudulent. But this Principle does not extend to counsel’s knowledge or suspicion of the
1 W. Michael Reisman & Christina Parajon Skinner, Fraudulent Evidence Before Public Interna-
tional Tribunals: The Dirty Stories of International Law 179, 191 (2014).
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other party’s fraudulent conduct. These Principles therefore may not be seen as generating
any expectation that counsel for an opposing party would challenge or draw attention to the
other party’s potentially fraudulent documents. General concerns about the integrity of the
dispute settlement process at the Court might prompt counsel for an opposing party to
challenge the authenticity of evidence that might impact the factual accuracy of the record
before the Court. But as Michael Reisman and Catherine Skinner have shown, counsel in
such situations have tended to be loyal, first and foremost, to their clients (the litigating
states), while concerns about the integrity of the Court’s factual record have assumed a
secondary importance.2
Fraudulent Evidence from the Perspective of the Court
Should an opposing party refrain from challenging the other party’s documentary evidence,
the Court might be faced with a decision about whether or not to consider the matter itself,
proprio motu. The Court has no independent obligation to investigate suspicious evidence
not formally challenged by one of the parties. Neither the Statute nor Rules of Court oblige
the Court to raise questions about fraudulent or forged evidence, and in general, these
instruments are vague with respect to evidentiary matters. This is not surprising given that
the Committee of Jurists, which drafted the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice (which forms the basis for the ICJ’s Statute), was focused less on procedural or
evidentiary issues, and more on fundamental issues concerning the Court’s competency and
composition.
But the ICJ Statute and the Rules of Court do not leave the Court powerless in situations
of fraud—the Court does, in fact, have the capacity to take measures if it suspects fraud.
Articles 48–50 of the Court’s Statute, for example, would allow it to verify the authenticity
of evidence by asking the party that produced the suspect evidence to provide explanations,
and by retaining its own experts to examine the evidence. These options would, however,
require the Court (or a member of the Court) to have thoroughly examined the annexes to
the parties’ pleadings well before the oral hearings, in order to allow sufficient time for such
explanations or expert reports. This may not be realistic given the Court’s working methods,
and its general reluctance to actively direct the parties with respect to evidentiary matters.
Finally, should an opposing party decide to challenge the authenticity of the other party’s
documentary evidence, the Court would then be faced with decisions about how to respond.
In Qatar v. Bahrain, the Court adopted a notably passive role at this stage.3 After Bahrain
challenged the authenticity of eighty-one documents annexed to Qatar’s Memorial, the Court
did not immediately require Qatar to respond to this challenge, nor did it rule on the matter.4
Moreover, Qatar continued to rely on the challenged documents in a subsequent written
pleading.5 The Court later required Qatar to submit an interim report on the matter.6 In this
report, which Qatar submitted more than a year after Bahrain had raised its challenge, Qatar
indicated that it had decided to disregard the challenged documents.7 At this point, the Court
did not issue a ruling excluding the documents from the record. Instead, the Court effectively
2 Id. at 8–9.
3 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Merits, Judgment,
2001 ICJ Rep. 40, paras. 15–23 (Mar. 16).
4 Id., paras. 15–16.
5 Id., para. 18.
6 Id., para. 19.
7 Id., para. 20.
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left it to the parties to reach an understanding on how to proceed.8 Bahrain led the way: it
responded to Qatar’s report by noting that Qatar had abandoned the ‘‘impeached documents,’’
and it concluded that Qatar could not make any further reference to them and that the Court
would adjudicate the merits of the case without regard to them.9 Qatar subsequently expressed
its regret about the situation—thus seemingly accepting this outcome.10 In a subsequent
procedural order, the Court adopted the understanding reached by the parties.11 The judgment
on the merits merely recounts this procedural history, without mentioning the words ‘‘fraud’’
or ‘‘forged,’’ and without reprimanding Qatar.12
Had the Court taken a more active approach to this matter, it might have disposed of
Bahrain’s challenge more expediently, and with greater force—it might have sent a warning
to future litigants before the Court about the repercussions of fraudulent evidence. In future
cases, the Court might consider taking a more active stance by requiring both parties to file
reports on the authenticity of challenged evidence before either party submits any further
pleadings. In addition to reports submitted by the parties, the Court could also hire its own
historians and/or forensic experts to assess the authenticity of challenged evidence. Ideally,
the Court would do so in a transparent manner, by formally appointing an expert under
Article 50 of the Statute—a procedure which would allow the parties to review and comment
on any expert reports.13 On the basis of these expert reports, the Court would then rule on
the authenticity of the challenged evidence and formally decide whether to exclude it from
the evidentiary record. In Qatar v. Bahrain, by contrast, the Court left it to the parties to
reach a mutually acceptable understanding, and it never formally excluded the evidence from
the record or reprimanded Qatar.
The Court’s traditionally deferential or diplomatic attitude toward litigants as sovereign
states may make it reluctant to publicize misconduct by parties, or to rebuke them for it.
But as a permanent judicial institution, the Court may have an interest in making its procedures
in cases of suspected fraud more formal and transparent. Should concerns about the authentic-
ity of evidence arise in the future, the Court might adopt more formal and transparent
measures with a view toward deterring future litigants from submitting fraudulent documents,
and encouraging counsel to exercise greater scrutiny—to the extent possible.
Summary by Douglas Cantwell*
Approximately eighty people attended the Roundtable. ASIL President Lori Damrosch
began the session, reflecting on Professor Vagts’ work and her admiration for him as a
scholar, mentor, colleague, and friend. Professor Damrosch’s introduction was followed by
remarks from Karen Vagts, who offered personalized reflections on her father’s life and
work. The Roundtable’s Convener, Professor Catherine Rogers of Penn State School of Law,
reflected on working with Professor Vagts as a younger scholar. During these introductory
8 Id., para. 23.
9 Id., para. 20.
10 Id.
11 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Order, 1999 ICJ
Rep. 3, 7 (Feb. 17).
12 Qatar v. Bahr., 2001 ICJ Rep. at 40, paras. 15–23.
13 Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice, Rule 67(2).
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